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To a German audience, Franz von Liszt (1851–1919) requires no introduction. His
achievements and influence as a criminal law scholar are well known. However,
his influence in Norway and on Norwegian criminal law may require some more
elaboration. In Norway, Liszt’s influence is particularly related to the penal code
of 1902.1 The passing of this code was a foundational moment for modern Norwe-
gian criminal law. To understand why, we should start with some historical exer-
cises.
The penal code of 1902 replaced the criminal code of 1842. The latter was a
product of section 94 in the Norwegian Constitution of 1814 (which still forms the
constitutional basis for the Norwegian legal order, albeit thoroughly revised in
2014). Section 94, inspired by the dominant Rechtsstaats-ideas prevalent in the
period, required a new criminal (and also civil) code to be enacted.2 The purpose
of requiring a new criminal code was (among others) to address the problems with
the fragmented character of the contemporary criminal law. The 1842 code was an
ambitious project, and its eventual completion was a huge achievement for Nor-
wegian law. It was drafted from the ideals of Feuerbach’s conception of criminal
law and the Bavarian criminal code of 1813, but also the French code pénal of 1810
and later European codes from the first part of the 19th century, such as the Hann-
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1 See for instance R. Hauge, Straffens begrunnelser (Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1996), pp. 207 ff.
and 234 ff.
2 On this paragraph, see further H. Sandvik/D. Michalsen (eds.), Kodifikasjon og konstitusjon –
Grunnloven § 94s krav til lovbøker i norsk historie, Nye perspektiver på Grunnloven 1814–2014 (Pax,
Oslo 2013).
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over code of 1840.3 The code of 1902, for its part, was in a sense the first ‘modern’
code of Norwegian criminal law. It responded to the significant social changes in
Norway at the turn of the 20th century, a period essentially related to the concept
of modernity.4 This is of course where Liszt and his positivism enters the scene of
Norwegian criminal law.
Central to this code were the highly influential figures Bernhard Getz and
Francis Hagerup. The latter, Francis Hagerup (1853–1921), was a monumental fig-
ure in Norway.5 He was a leading politician (and two-time prime minister) but also
a highly distinguished legal professor. He was particularly theoretically mined
(for a Norwegian context), and formed his own intellectual programme inspired
by the German doctrine—Savigny and Ihering in particular. Even though he was a
kind of legal polyhistor or generalist, his professor chair at Norway’s then only
university in Kristiania (now Oslo) was in criminal law. He was to become the
country’s most important criminal law professor.6 Bernhard Getz (1850–1901)
was, for his part, first a law professor, but proceeded into other influential roles
in the Norwegian criminal justice system.7 He was Norway’s first Director of Public
Prosecutions and was responsible for leading the commission for reform of the
criminal procedure code of 1887. Importantly for this article, Getz was also made
leader of the commission responsible for drafting the Norwegian penal code of
1902. These two were close collaborators—Hagerup as the high-ranking politician
and theorist, Getz as the high-ranking practitioner.8
Now, the story goes, Liszt exercised a strong influence on these two, which in
turn resulted in a code that has often been called positivistic.9 This is an exaggera-
3 SeeL. Gröning/E. J. Husabø/J. Jacobsen,Frihet, forbrytelse og straff–En systematisk fremstilling
av norsk strafferett, 2nd edition (Fagbokforlaget, Bergen, 2019), pp. 3–4, andHauge (1996), p. 142.
4 For perspectives on this code, see G. Heivoll/S. Flaatten (eds.), «Straff, lov, historie» –Historiske
perspektiver på straffeloven av 1902 (Pax, Oslo, 2014).
5 On Hagerup, see S. Blandhol/D. Michalsen, Rettsforsker, politiker, internasjonalist: Perspektiver
på Francis Hagerup, Oslo Studies in Legal History 2 (Unipax, Oslo 2007).
6 See further J. Jacobsen, Hagerup og den strafferettslege ansvarslæra (Fagbokforlaget, Bergen
2017a).
7 OnGetz, see further A. Vogt, Bernhard Getz (Aschehoug, Oslo 1950).
8 See also Hauge (1996), p. 218. On Hagerup’s view on the relation between theory and practice,
see J. Jacobsen, Teori og praksis i strafferetten, K. E. Sæther/K. A. Kvande/R. Torgersen/U. Strid-
beck (eds.), Straff og frihet: Til vern om den liberale rettsstat – Festskrift til Tor-Aksel Busch (Gylden-
dal, Oslo 2019), pp. 365–378.
9 As in German literature, the terms here applied varies somewhat—a variety that emphasises
some different aspects of this approach to criminal law. The terms ‘positivistic’ and ‘the positive
school’ – used for instance by A. Ross, Forbrydelsesbegrebets definition, Svensk Juristtidning
(1976), pp. 241–271, p. 258 – reflect the underlying theory of science and the emphasis on facts and
utility. For instance C. Häthén, Straffrättsvetenskap och kriminalpolitik – De europeiska straffteor-
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tion, but not one without substance. Clearly, Liszt was at the time the driving
force of European criminal law scholarship, and his criminal law theory was cen-
tral to the ongoing discussions.10 As specifically regards Norway, there were in-
deed close connections between Liszt and the Norwegian duo.11 The latter two
both participated in the first world congress of the Internationale Kriminalistische
Vereinigung (hereinafter: IKV) in Amsterdam in 1889, and initiated the Norwegian
branch, Den norske kriminalistforening, in 1892, with Hagerup as the leader. The
third IKV world congress took place in Kristiania. Prior to this, Getz’s draft for a
new penal code was translated into German and commented on by Liszt, who
applauded it.12 In his lecture on Die Aufgabe und die Methode der Strafrechtswis-
senschaft, Liszt even stated: ‘der steigende Einfluß unserer neuen Richtung zeigt
sich am besten in den Strafgesetzentwürfen der Schweiz und Norwegens’.13 Ha-
gerup must have found a strong common point of reference with Liszt, a student
of Ihering, in their admiration for the latter’s works.14 Today, however, as a new
penal code has replaced the code of 1902, positivism seems to be out of fashion.
As we will return to, we seldom hear about Liszt and positivism today. So, per-
haps ‘big impact in 1902, little known today’ sums up the story of Liszt’s influence
in Norway.
The German literature allows for a more nuanced story to be told as regards
Liszt’s influence on German criminal law.15 In this article, I will tell a different and
ierna och deras betydelse för svensk strafflagstiftning 1906–1931 – Tre studier (Lund University
Press, Lund 1990), p. 71 uses the terms ‘modern’ school and ‘sociological’ school. Some even use
the term ‘third school’, reflecting the place of the theorywithin its contemporary landscapeof crim-
inological theories, see Hauge (1996), pp. 207 ff.
10 Also to criminology, see for instance R. F. Wetzel, Inventing the Criminal – AHistory of German
Criminology 1880–1945 (The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill/London 2000),
pp. 31 ff.
11 See e.g., Hagerup’s Gedächtnisrede over Getz, with an editorial note by Liszt in ZStW 22 (1902),
pp. 481–498 (originally in Norwegian in Hagerup’s own journal TfR 14 (1901), pp. 341–357). See
also Hauge (1996), p. 217.
12 Norwegian translation published in F. von Liszt, Kritik af det norske Straffelovudkast, TfR 2
(1889), pp. 356–392. (Lammasch also reviewed it, see H. Lammasch, Der norwegische Strafgeset-
zentwurf, ZStW 14 (1894), pp. 505–531. Liszt was, however, at some points critical to the draft, for
instance in regard to the abolishment of the death penalty, see Liszt (1889), pp. 362–363.
13 F. von Liszt, Die Aufgaben und dieMethode der Strafrechtswissenschaft [1899], quoted from F.
von Liszt, Strafrechtliche Aufsätze und Vorträge, Band 2: 1892–1904 (Guttentag, Berlin, 1905),
pp. 284–298, p. 294.
14 ForHagerup, see inparticular F. Hagerup, Ihering–Windscheid–En litterærKarakteristik,TfR
6 (1893), pp. 1–26, see further Jacobsen (2017a), pp. 26–36.
15 See for instance W. Naucke, Die Kriminalpolitik des Marburger Programms 1882, ZStW 94
(1982), pp. 525–564 and in particular, T. Stäcker,Die Franz von Liszt-Schule und ihre Auswirkungen
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perhaps distinct story for Norway, too. I will show that Liszt did not have such a
strong impact on Norwegian criminal law in his own time as he is typically as-
cribed, but that recent changes in the Norwegian system of criminal sanctions
may make us wonder if Liszt does not in fact have the last laugh. The ongoing
recent developments conform to such an extent to positivistic ideas that the re-
semblance is hard to overlook.16 Could this convergence of positivistic ideas and
the recent developments in Norway also be said to be a result of Liszt’s works?
Here we should be more cautious. Rather, the Norwegian pragmatist legal culture
can be said to be particularly receptive to ideas like Liszt’s, and it has in recent
decades lacked the principled orientation needed to properly address such ideas
that gain strength from other forces in contemporary criminal policy.
One reason for this exercise is to add to the history of Liszt and his influence
on Norwegian criminal law. Another important reason is to acquire a useful prism
into the at first glance confusing development of the Norwegian system of crim-
inal sanctions, a development which, similar to the critical reception of positivism
from a Rechtsstaat-point of view, we now should be critical towards. I will present
the historical background for this discussion in more detail in section 2. Here, I
will outline the sanctioning system in the previous criminal codes of Norway, and
discuss the positivistic influence on the code of 1902 in particular. I will proceed
in section 3 to outline the contemporary system of criminal sanctions in Norway,
related in particular to the current penal code of 2005. This section will hopefully
be of value to readers irrespective of the broader subject of the article. Lastly, in
section 4 I will provide an analysis of broader developments. Here, the Liszt-per-
spective is made more nuanced and applied as a critical perspective on the devel-
opment in Norway. The article will concentrate on the sanctioning system as it
appears in substantive criminal law. The administration of punishment will not
be included. This would add important perspectives, but also significantly ex-
pand the article.17 Even with this limitation, the article covers a lot of ground. In
auf die deutsche Strafrechtsentwicklung (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2012). The latter work adopts a Ger-
man (andmore thorough) perspective on several issues to be addressed concerning Norway in the
following.
16 Hauge (1996) sees thedevelopment till the 1990sasadevelopment towardsa ‘technical, admin-
istrative criminal policy’ (p. 343), but does not capture the parallels to positivism, which perhaps
are even clearer today. (The translation of this and other Norwegian sources have been done byme
for the sake of this article, unless otherwise is stated.)
17 On Liszt and the administration of punishment, see in particular H. Müller-Dietz, Das Marbur-
ger Programmaus der Sicht des Strafvollzugs,ZStW 94 (1982), pp. 599–618. Concerning the admin-
istration of punishment in Norway, see e.g., L. Gröning, Straffgenomföring som en del av straf-
frättssystemet: Principförklaring av fängelsestraffets innehåll, Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap 126
(2013), pp. 145–196.
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order to maintain focus on the overall perspective of the article, I will at several
points simply refer to previous works of mine (and others) for a more detailed
elaboration of the specific issues that are addressed.
II. The Penal Code of 1902 and the Limits
of Positivism—Then
1. The shift from 1842 to 1902
As already stated, the penal code of 1902 was enacted to replace the criminal code
of 1842. This shift was something more than just a renewed code. The titles of the
codes, which differ in a significant way, illustrate this. The code of 1842 was titled
Kriminalloven; in German, Kriminalgesetz; in English, the Criminal Code. The code
of 1902, however, was called Straffeloven, i.e., Strafgesetz or the Penal Code. This
shift of terms illustrates a certain shift from criminal law as a system of funda-
mental norms, i.e., more of a deontological point of view, to a focus on criminal
law primarily as a system for punishment, i.e., a social instrument. In the latter
lies the link to positivism.
We should be cautious not to exaggerate the difference between the codes.
For instance, the code of 1842 was certainly influenced by utilitarian considera-
tions and, in line with Feuerbach’s viewpoints, general deterrence was a central
aim.18 The code of 1902, for its part, was much more embedded in classical crim-
inal law viewpoints than is usually recognised.19 Still, one can see a certain shift.
By 1902, the utilitarian approach seems to have grown stronger, at least in the
sense that Kantian and Hegelian viewpoints were now very much out of fashion.
As we will return to, this reflected trends in German scholarship, including that of
Liszt, who opposed Kantian and Hegelian theories.20
To understand why the 1902 code represents a shift in Norwegian criminal
law, we should also add a broader perspective. Norway (soon to be fully inde-
18 See also e.g., H. J. Mæland, Fra Kriminalloven til straffeloven, Tidsskrift for strafferett 2 (2002),
pp. 326–337. For an outline of the system of reactions and its motivation, see J. Jacobsen, Utsyn
over utviklingstrekk i det strafferettslege reaksjonssystemet, Kritisk Juss 43 (2017b), pp. 118–144,
pp. 121–123.
19 See J. Jacobsen, ‘i selveDybderne af denmenneskligeBevidsthed omRet ogMoral’: Straffelova
av 1902 og den tyske skulestriden, in G. Heivoll/S. Flaatten (eds.), «Straff, lov, historie» –Historiske
perspektiver på straffeloven av 1902 (Akademisk publisering, Oslo, 2014), pp. 44–85.
20 See further below.
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pendent21) experienced societal problems related to modernisation, urbanisation,
and industrialisation. The code of 1902 was part of a series or ‘package’ of codes
that aimed to address such social problems. This included codes concerning de-
linquent children and vagrancy, which together sought to deal with such crim-
inogenic factors within the Norwegian society.22 This is positivistic-style think-
ing: different social technologies, criminal law included (although not foremost),
were applied to deal with specific social problems. This broader legislative pro-
ject seems also to be the reason for the penal code of 1902 being labelled ‘posi-
tivistic’. Here, however, we must step cautiously. If we are to consider whether
the penal code of 1902, or later the code of 2005, can be labelled as positivistic,
we must start by defining this term. Given Liszt’s prominent position, it is useful
to start out with his theory. Thereafter we will look into the details of the two
codes, and compare these to how we have defined ‘positivism’.
2. Liszt’s positivism—a brief outline
To investigate Liszt’s own positivistic theory of criminal law is a major enterprise.
Liszt wrote a large number of works, and interpretations of his viewpoints vary to
some degree.23 Exploring this body of works, and the viewpoints and develop-
ment they reflect, is not possible within the limits of this article. Here, however,
one very central feature of this theory, firmly embedded in the programmatic lec-
ture Der Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht from 1882, will allow us to gain ground.24 The
feature I am referring to is the well-known three-track distinction between offen-
21 Norway gained independence from Denmark and a constitution in 1814, but was soon after
forced into aunionwith Swedenwhich lasteduntil 1905.Hagerupwas thenprimeminister and this
became his political downfall. He was committed to the view that Norway should stay in the union
only to discover that he lacked support for this view (in a referendum 99.5% voted against the
union). He subsequently resigned as prime minister, see H. Danielsen, Francis Hagerup og norsk
konservatisme, in Blandhol/Michalsen (2005), pp. 123–144.
22 See further different contributions in Heivoll/Flaatten (2014). An overview of these codes and
an explanation of Getz’s central role in regard to these can be found in Hauge (1996), pp. 234–236.
23 Many of his works are collected in F. von Liszt, Strafrechtliche Aufsätze und Vorträge, Band 1:
1875–1891 (Guttentag, Berlin, 1905) and F. von Liszt, Strafrechtliche Aufsätze undVorträge, Band 2:
1892–1904 (Guttentag, Berlin, 1905). For expositions of Liszt’s theory, see e.g., E. Schmidt, Einfüh-
rung in die Geschichte der deutschen Strafrechtspflege, dritte Auflage (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
Göttingen 1995), pp. 357–386, Naucke (1982), M. Frommel, Präventionsmodelle in der deutschen
Strafzweck-Diskussion (Dunker & Humblot, Berlin, 1987), andHäthen (1990), pp. 77–91.
24 See Der Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht (1882), quoted from F. von Liszt, Strafrechtliche Aufsätze
und Vorträge, Band 1: 1875–1891 (Guttentag, Berlin, 1905), pp. 127–179, in particular pp. 163–173.
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ders with a potential for rehabilitation, offenders that should be incapacitated,
and the ‘normal’ offenders (located between the other two types) who simply
should be taught a lesson, i.e., deterred. This distinction has also been empha-
sised in later descriptions of Liszt’s enterprise, for instance by Thomas Vorm-
baum.25 It is also emphasised by leading Norwegian criminologists and criminal
law theorists, such as Ragnar Hauge and Henry John Mæland.26 It differentiates
between offenders not by what act they have performed, but by how they must be
treated in order to prevent further criminal acts. The performed criminal act is
only an entrance point to, and empirical basis for, this prospective consideration
over the individual offender.
We should note Liszt’s own reservations about how the aims of incapacita-
tion, deterrence, and rehabilitation should be concretised. Liszt was very clear
about the limitations of his reasoning in this regard—for good reason. The right
punishment is the necessary punishment, Liszt claimed.27 ‘Necessary’ relates here
to the protection of legal goods, the most basic of which, in Liszt’s theory, are the
individual and societal drive for survival. This ‘necessity test’ thus has empirical
references, in line with Liszt’s rejection of a normative framework for criminal
law. Thereby, the forming of the sanctioning system becomes a question of what
works. The tripartite division becomes so basic because it clarifies the (logically)
possible ways to make citizens abstain from recidivism—apart from, of course,
leaving them alone and hoping for the best, an option that Liszt seemingly did
not have much faith in. How these three different approaches can be applied and
concretised is thereby open to different solutions, contingent upon the time,
place, and not least the social setting within which the viewpoint is operationa-
lised. To this we should add the related epistemic challenges. Operationalisation
of this theory requires (empirical) knowledge about society and the effects of dif-
ferent means that can be applied. Liszt himself mentions (the lack of) the needed
criminal statistics. So, before embarking on the tripartite division, he underlines:
Wenn ich es daher im folgenden versuche, eine Antwort auf die gestellten Fragen zu geben,
so weiß ich so gut wie irgend jemand, daß diese Antwort nicht auf die Bedeutung einer
definitiven, unzweifelhaften Feststellung Anspruch erheben kann. Dennoch dürfte der Ver-
such, die bisherigen Ergebnisse zusammenzufassen und zu verwerten, nach mehr als einer
Richtung hin sich fruchtbringend erweisen.28
25 T. Vormbaum, Einführung in die moderne Strafrechtsgeschichte (Springer, Berlin, 2009), p. 125.
26 SeeMæland (2002), pp. 328–329 andHauge (1996), pp. 209–210.
27 Liszt (1882), p. 161.
28 Liszt (1882), p. 163.
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This (de-normativised) positivism of Liszt, stripped of metaphysically contingent
concepts of freedom and rights, had (for obvious reasons) less to say on questions
of criminalisation and the action norms of criminal law, apart from emphasising
the basic human drive towards protection of self and survival.29 This limitation is
also reflected in the ambiguous relation between Liszt’s dogmatism in the Lehr-
buch and the positivistic enterprise.30 Liszt’s limitations in this regard are also
reflected in the ambivalent reception of Liszt in Norwegian criminal law theory
and legislation, which sheds clear light on why we should be hesitant to describe
the code of 1902 and Norwegian criminal law of the times as positivistic. This we
will return to.
Before we proceed, we should underline that Liszt’s intellectual enterprise
developed during his intellectual career. When we speak of Liszt in the following,
it is the 1882 Liszt that we primarily refer to as the foremost symbol or expression
of what is known as positivistic criminal law. A comprehensive discussion of
Liszt’s works and development would add important nuances to the following,
but also many, many more pages.
3. Positivism and the code of 1902—the sanctioning system
The positivistic programme received attention and interest in Norway and the in-
itial reception of it was indeed positive. A notable step in the development of the
Norwegian sanctioning system was, for instance, Hagerup’s introduction of sus-
pended sentences.31 This happened back in 1894. The reasoning was clearly in
line with positivistic viewpoints: certain prison sentences, even if in themselves
proportional to the crime, were too short to fulfil any rehabilitative or incapacitat-
ing purposes, but long enough to have unwanted consequences.32 Norway was
one of the first countries to introduce this solution, which may indicate a distinct
Norwegian cultural receptiveness for pragmatic considerations in criminal law.
29 Liszt expressed his positivistic/non-cognitivist view of science in Liszt (1899), p. 289: ‘Wis-
senschaftliche Erkenntnis aber ist kausale Erklärung ...’, see also p. 297. See also Schmidt (1995),
p. 366: ‘Liszt stand in der Tat so stark unter demEindruck der Naturwissenschaften seiner Zeit, daß
er wissenschaftliches Denken mit naturwissenschaftlichem recht eigentlich identifizierte.’ For a
thorough analysis of Liszt’s criminal policy in this regard, see Naucke (1982).
30 Liszt’sdogmatism isdiscussed for instance inNaucke (1982), pp. 554 ff. and inparticular E. Hei-
nitz, Franz von Liszt als Dogmatiker, ZStW 94 (1982), pp. 572–596.
31 See furtherF. Hagerup,OmbetingedeStraffedomme,Forhandlingsemnevedsyvendenordiske
juristmøde, Forhandlingerne paa det syvende nordiske Juristmøde i Kjøbenhavn den 28de, 29de og
30te August 1890 (Schultz, Kjøbenhavn, 1890), Bilag II pp. 1–33.
32 Hagerup (1890), pp. 3–4.
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Hagerup—the main commentator on Liszt’s work in Norway—seems, how-
ever, to have been sceptical towards positivism’s abandonment of classical crim-
inal law principles. Hagerup’s main concern was the fundamental role of the
‘ethical judgement’, so deeply embedded in both law and society, but which
Liszt’s enterprise compromised: ‘Can it be, that the positive school of criminal law
will be the human spirit’s final words on criminal law? I believe it not to be. One
cannot detach punishment from its relation to the wrongful act without thereby at
the same time abandon it as a legal institution and its ethical character.’33 There is
a telling development in Hagerup’s writings, where in early texts he welcomes the
empirical reorientation away from the abstract and ‘speculative’ Kant- and Hegel-
influenced school in German legal science, only to end up endorsing natural-law-
like considerations at the end of his intellectual career, and expressing himself in
Kantian ways regarding the principle of right theory (Rechtsprinzip).34
This conflict between classical criminal law ideas and positivism, ending
mainly in favour of the former, can also be seen reflected in the penal code of
1902. If we are to speak of the ‘positivistic’ code of 1902, this is in a highly watered
down sense.35 Rather, the code builds on central parts on the same criminal law
ideas as the code of 1842. It is hard to locate distinct positivistic ideas in the of-
fences and in the criteria for criminal responsibility in the 1902 code. The criteria
for criminal responsibility, for instance, were still the classical principles that had
followed European criminal law at least since Pufendorf’s reception of Aristotle’s
theory of responsibility, and their application in early German criminal law theo-
ry.36 For instance, the rule about criminal insanity was not amended. In fact, it
was Sweden, inspired by Lombroso, that later abandoned this classical require-
ment for criminal responsibility.37 Liszt had his own reservations in this regard.
What about the other side of the penal code, the reaction or sanctioning system?
As mentioned, this is the positivistic theory’s main interest and emphasis. If the
penal code of 1902 should deserve the label ‘positivistic’, this part of the code is
33 See, e.g., F. Hagerup, Ret og kultur i det nittende aarhundrede (Gyldendalske boghandel Nor-
disk forlag, Kjøbenhavn, 1919), p. 74, see further Jacobsen (2017a), pp. 97–127.
34 Compare F. Hagerup, Moderne Kriminalpolitik. En ny international kriminalistisk Forening,
TfR (1890), pp. 224–246, pp. 226–227 with F. Hagerup, Indledning til studiet af den almindelige
retslære [incomplete, posthumous publishedwork], TfR (1922), pp. 179–217, pp. 199.
35 See further Jacobsen (2012).
36 See further in J. Jacobsen, Pufendorf og den europeiske strafferettsdoktrinen, inU. Andersson/
C.Wong/H. ÖrnemarkHansen (eds.), Festskrift till Per Ole Träskman (Norstedts juridik, Stockholm,
2011), pp. 247–258
37 See further, e.g., S. Levander, God vilja räckte inte – ett personligt perspektiv på svensk rättsp-
sykiatri,Nordisk Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskab (2011), pp. 59–70.
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also where we should expect to see its influence most clearly. This is the case, but
the influence is still not very strong.
The penal code of 1902 indeed had elements in its sanctioning system that
represented a break with the code of 1842, and which can only be explained by
positivistic influences. The forms of punishment originally included in the 1902
code were the classical forms of imprisonment (including a distinct and milder
form of hefte as a less intrusive form) and fines, in addition to the possibility for
removal from office as a civil servant in specific cases.38 Furthermore, the code
had a series of supplementary forms of punishment, which could only be added
to the primary punishments. This included loss of rights, forfeiture of objects,
publishing of the sentence, and expulsion from certain areas. The influence of
positivism is most visible in the inclusion of a separate track in the sanction sys-
tem for dangerous offenders, a departure from the stricter system of punishments
in the code of 1842. This new track included a particular sanction called preventive
detention (forvaring in Norwegian) in section 39 of the code. This sanction allowed
for offenders freed from criminal responsibility due to insanity or who received a
milder punishment due to diminished capacity for criminal responsibility to be
detained in insane asylums, rehabilitative institutions, or workhouses. Further-
more, section 65 allowed convicted offenders to be kept in prison as long as
needed, but no longer than three times the imprisonment sentence, and in no case
for longer than 15 additional years. These innovations received international at-
tention.39 They were, however, no (immediate) success in practice, and were later
amended. More on that to follow.
However, even if the 1902 system of sanctions shows traces of positivistic
influence, it still seems mainly to side with classical criminal law. The code main-
tained a clear-cut distinction between the responsibility side and the sanctioning
side of criminal law, and distinguished furthermore between punishment and
other criminal sanctions, the latter including the so-called ‘special reactions’ for
insane offenders. The sanctions designated as punishments were, for their part,
clearly designed to allocate blame as a means of general deterrence, and were
therefore also reactions proportional to the seriousness of the committed offence.
Ultimately, it seems most adequate to speak of the penal code of 1902 in gen-
eral as a classical style code, moderately influenced by positivism, but not there-
38 See penal code of 1902, § 15. For overviews of the sanction system in the code of 1902, see F. Ha-
gerup, Almindelig borgerlig straffelov af 22. Mai 1902 og lov om dens ikrafttræden af samme dato –
udgivet med oplysende anmærkninger og henvisninger (H. Aschehoug & co, Kristiania 1903),
pp. 17 ff. and (later) Jon Skeie, Den norske strafferett – Første bind, Den almindelige del (Olaf Norlis
Forlag, Oslo 1937), pp. 534 ff. For a brief overview, see Jacobsen (2017b), pp. 124–125.
39 See Hauge (1996), p. 229.
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by a ‘positivistic’ code in itself. The moderate influence that positivism had, even
in this clearly sympathetic context, seems to support the common conception of
positivism as a distinct school in the history of criminal law, with limited influ-
ence and now left behind. However, at least for Norwegian criminal law this opi-
nion is unwarranted, as will be seen when we look to recent developments in Nor-
way. Perhaps the times were not (yet) ready for Liszt’s ideas. The principled ap-
proach of Hagerup, and to some extent his successor Jon Skeie (1871–1951),40 was
abandoned by, in particular, Johs. Andenæs (1912–2003). Andenæs completely
dominated Norwegian criminal law in the second half of the 20th century.41 In this
period, the classical principles of criminal law were downplayed and replaced by
a (stronger) pragmatist point of view, which is more compatible with Liszt’s theo-
ry. As we now will see, (the drafting of) the penal code of 2005 testifies to this.
III. The Recent Development of the Norwegian
System of Criminal Sanctions—Towards
Positivism?
1. Liszt’s absence in recent sources
Not surprisingly, Liszt and his positivism seemed not to have gained attention in
the drafting of the 2005 code. When reviewing literature from this period, one
quickly sees that Liszt is no central figure here either. For instance, this applies to
Andenæs’s book on Norwegian criminal law, Alminnelig strafferett, which ap-
peared in several editions and became highly influential—the Norwegian counter-
part to Liszt’s Lehrbuch, so to speak.42 The only edition where Liszt’s positivistic
theory is mentioned is the first edition.43 Here, Andenæs makes a highly interest-
ing remark which deserves to be quoted. After having hailed Liszt as ‘the brightest
40 Asadoctoral student, Skeiewas inBerlin to study criminal lawand international law,withLiszt
as teacher.
41 Seemore on Andenæs in J. Jacobsen, Zur gegenwärtigen norwegischen Strafrechtsdogmatik –
Andenæs und die Folgen, ZStW 123 (2011), pp. 609–632.
42 The book was first published in 1956, as one of four editions (also 1974, 1989 and 1979), that
Andenæs himself published before he passed away in 2003. Two more editions have been pub-
lished since then (2005, 2016).
43 A brief reference to Liszt on insanity ‘survives’ for more editions, but this is of less relevance to
us here. Liszt is also brieflymentioned byAndenæs in, for instance his late bookwhere he reflected
on a series of challenges to criminal law, cfr. J. Andenæs, Straffen som problem (Exil, Halden 1996)
at p. 27 and p. 99. Again, the questions of determinism and insanity provide the context.
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name in criminal law science at the end of the last century and the beginning of
this [i.e., the 20th] century’, and after briefly describing Liszt’s three-tracked pro-
gramme, Andenæs adds:
If one looks only at genuine punishments, it is easy to see that Norwegian law has not ef-
fected this programme. On the contrary, one can say that punishment is characterised by a
certain relation to the seriousness of the crime, not by pure rehabilitative considerations.
When purely rehabilitative considerations are decisive, this is in the shape of preventive
measures not characterised as punishment. However, when the system of sanctions is seen
together, one comes closer to the [Liszt’s] programme. In this regard, there is a huge differ-
ence when compared to the situation 60–70 years ago.44
To my knowledge, Andenæs never picked up on and developed this claim, and
the story in Norway seemed to be that Liszt’s positivism was a historical, even if
significant, event in the history of Continental and Nordic criminal law.45 It is
symptomatic that in the leader of the Penal Code Commission, Anders Bratholm’s,
outline of criminal law from 1980, Liszt is only briefly mentioned in a very short
historical outline. Here he is grouped together with Feuerbach as a proponent of
relative criminal law theories.46
2. A system of sanctions in change
The Norwegian system of criminal sanctions had been more or less continuously
subject to change since the enactment of the code of 1902. Preventive detention,
for instance, was seldom used and was reformed already in 1929.47 Measures
aimed at delinquent children, such as the so-called work-school, which was in-
troduced in 1928, were tried out and then abandoned.48 To a large extent this has,
as in many other countries, been a process where new and well-intentioned sanc-
tions are developed, only to prove disappointingly ineffective, and are then re-
versed to traditional forms of punishment. However, from the early 1980s on-
wards more thorough changes in the system of criminal sanctions appeared. This
44 J. Andenæs,Alminnelig strafferett (Akademisk forlag, Oslo 1956), p. 68 (italicised here).
45 Exceptions are specific historical comments and outlines, see e.g., Hauge (1996) and Mæland
(2002).
46 A. Bratholm, Strafferett og samfunn (Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1980), p. 114. Bratholmwas that
year appointed leader of the Penal Code Commission, but resigned after the second white paper in
1992.
47 Code of 22 February 1929, see here also Hauge (1996), pp. 238–239.
48 See e.g., Hauge (1996), pp. 239–240.
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period has coincided with the drafting of the penal code of 2005, which entered
into force on 1st October 2015.49
The fact that it took almost 40 years from when the process of developing a
new penal code was put into motion in 1978 to when the code entered into force in
2015 requires in itself some explanation. During its lifespan, the code of 1902 was
subject to many reforms with different parts of it being revised and modernised.
The opinion was that the code had a quite functional and adaptable basic struc-
ture, allowing for partial reforms in different areas. In 1978, however, the highly
controversial Criminal Report from the Ministry of Justice on criminal policy men-
tioned a new penal code as one means to develop Norwegian criminal law.50 This
idea was presented in a rather downscaled way. There seems to have been no
substantial reasons for initiating this reform, nor any genuine reflection on the
challenges inherent in this project.51 In other words: this code was not the kind of
programmatic project that the previous codes had been. The 1842 code was a con-
stitutional project. The 1902 code aimed to prepare Norwegian criminal law for
modern society. The project that now was sparked was first and foremost a matter
of political symbolism, an early example of such symbolic legislation that we later
(unfortunately) have become quite accustomed to.
The lack of reasoning on the need for a new penal code (as well as the chal-
lenges associated with drafting it) came home to roost in unfortunate ways. The
Penal Code Commission was appointed by the Ministry of Justice in 1980.52 Their
first report (white paper) came in 1983, and throughout the 1980s and 1990s, sev-
eral other reports were to follow (without leading to substantial progress).53 When
the commission delivered its final general report in 2002 (NOU 2002: 4), it was
mainly the general provisions of the code that had been prepared. The commis-
49 The Penal Code 2005 section 411, first paragraph. For an overview and translation in German,
see E. J. Husabø/K. Cornils, Das norwegische Strafgesetz: vom 20. Mai 2005 nach dem Stand vom
1. Juni 2014; deutscheÜbersetzung und Einführung (Berlin, Duncker &Humblot 2014). An unofficial
English translation can be found at https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/2005–05–20–28 (last
accessed 25.09.19).
50 St.meld. nr. 104 (1977–1978) Om kriminalpolitikken. For the critical reception, see e.g.,
J. Andenæs/G. Fr. Rieber-Mohn/L. J. Dorenfeldt/O. T. Laake, Kommentarer til Kriminalmeldingen
(Grøndahl, Oslo 1979), see also, for instance, J. Andenæs, Developments in criminal law and penal
system:Norway1977–1978,TheCriminalLawReview (1979), pp. 447–451.Adifferent story is toldby
Minister (then) Inger Louise Valle, see herDette står jeg for (Gyldendal, Oslo 1989), pp. 179–180.
51 In St.meld. nr. 104 (1977–1978), p. 168 a need for adapting the criminal legislation to the signif-
icant social changes that had taken place since 1902 was mentioned, but the frequent and signifi-
cant changes in the 1902 code during the 1900’s had already sought to do this.
52 On the background andmandate for the Penal Code Commission, cfr. NOU 1983: 57, pp. 27–30.
53 Cfr. NOU 1983: 57, NOU 1992: 23, NOU 1992: 23, NOU 2002: 4 and NOU 2003: 18.
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sion did not deliver a draft for the part of the code concerning specific criminal
acts.54 The Ministry of Justice had to develop this part of the code mainly by itself,
completing the work in 2010,55 five years after the general provisions and the
chapter on international crimes were enacted in 2005. Still, it took another five
years before the code was put into force. The causes for this slow process are
many. An in-depth analysis is not possible here. It is, however, of relevance to us
that the first leader of the commission (there were many changes to the commis-
sion, including its leadership), was the aforementioned law professor Anders
Bratholm. He was a critical legal scholar, strongly engaged in subjects of legal
policy, but with less theoretical interest and competence. Generally, there was no
theoretical framework for the legislative process. The final delay from 2010 to 2015
appears to have been related to a peculiar conflict with the police over the need
for a new computer system. If anyone is considering drafting a new criminal code,
ask us Norwegians how not to go about.
The important point for us here is that during this long process, a series of
specific changes to the code of 1902 were implemented, many of which concerned
the sanctioning system and thereby are of high relevance to our subject. Several of
these changes were brought forward into the 2005 code.56 This is also the time for
us to bring back into focus the positivistic idea of different sanctions for the inca-
pacitation of dangerous offenders, deterrence of ‘normal’ offenders, and rehabili-
tation of offenders with a potential for this.
One of the additions to the Norwegian criminal justice system during the pro-
cess of developing the 2005 code had a typical incapacitating motivation, in line
with the dangerousness-track of Liszt’s system. Until then, the problem of danger-
ous offenders in Norway was solved by means of the so-called sikring-mechanism,
which prolonged incapacitation after the proportional prison sentence was
served. Sikring was mandated by the court, for instance in terms of a sentence of
21 years imprisonment and an additional 10 years of safeguarding.57 After a long
period of criticism, which emphasised for instance that this solution was unpre-
dictable for the person serving the sentence, a reform of the system was carried
54 Later on, NOU 2003: 18 was submitted, however, concerned only questions related to national
security.
55 Themost important preparatory works in this regard is Ot.prp. nr. 22 (2008–2009).
56 For general outlines of the system of criminal sanctions in this code, see Gröning/Husabø/
Jacobsen (2019), pp. 604–742, J. Andenæs/G. F. Rieber-Mohn/K. E. Sæther, Alminnelig strafferett,
6. utgave (Universitetsforlaget,Oslo 2016), pp. 376–568andS. Eskeland/A. P.Høgberg, Strafferett,
5. utgave (Cappelen Damm, Oslo 2017), pp. 390–502.
57 For a review on the sikring-system, see H. Røstad, «Sikringsinstituttet», NOU 1974: 17 Straffer-
ettslig utilregnelighet og strafferettslige særreaksjoner (attachment 3), pp. 186–273.
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out in 2001.58 This major reform had a significant impact on the Norwegian system
of criminal sanctions. It (re)introduced (a renewed version of) forvaring or preven-
tive detention. This time it was labelled as a punishment at the same time as it
replaced both the traditional prison sentence and the additional safeguarding.59
Thereby, this reform compromised the two-track system of punishment and safe-
guarding measures which even Liszt acknowledged. Punishment was now no
longer limited to retrospective blame considerations, but included prospective
considerations concerning danger. For the (well-meaning) critics of the previous
sikring-system this was a Pyrrhic victory, as this solution preserved the unpredict-
ability problem (as all indeterminate sanctions do), and also introduced what
many now consider to be the harshest punishment in Norwegian criminal law.60
The 2005 code also includes, in addition, other prospective sanctions as punish-
ment. Loss of rights as a form of punishment includes loss of position (or the right
to hold a position in the future) and also a prohibition on contacting certain per-
sons in the future, typically the victims of crimes (particularly in cases of domestic
violence or sexual abuse).61 Recently, loss of citizenship has also been included in
the list of punishments.62
If we turn to the opposite track in the positivistic system of sanctions, the
rehabilitation track, we quickly see even more changes that have been carried out
in the Norwegian system of criminal sanctions. In fact, already in the early 1980s,
only a few years after the process of developing the new criminal code was set in
motion, the penal sanction community service was tried out as a means to reduce
the prison population.63 Community sentence, as it later was coined, rapidly be-
came another central piece of the Norwegian criminal sanctioning system.64 This
was an option that secured a sufficiently ‘burdensome’ alternative to imprison-
ment, compared with suspended sentencing, which was considered an insuffi-
58 For the preparatory works for the reform, see NOU 1990: 5 and Ot.prp. nr. 87 (1993–1994). A
previous reform suggestion (NOU 1974: 17) stranded.
59 See sect. 40–47 and Gröning/Husabø/Jacobsen (2019), pp. 620–627, with further references.
60 B. Johnsen/H. J. Engbo, Forvaring i Norge,Danmark ogGrønland–noen likheter ogulikheter,
Nordisk Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskab (2015), pp. 175–194, p. 181.
61 Cfr. PC 2005 sect. 56–59. See further Gröning/Husabø/Jacobsen (2019), pp. 639–644, with
further references.
62 Endringslov 25. mai 2018 nr. 19. See also on the increasing entanglement of criminal law and
immigration law in N. B. Johansen/T. Ugelvik/K. F. Aas, Krimmigasjon? Den nye kontrollen av de
fremmede (Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 2013).
63 The community servicewas put into force as a pilot project in 1984. See further NOU 1982: 4.
64 From 1991 was the community sentence a regular part in Norwegian criminal law, see now the
penal code of 2005 sect. 48–52. See further Gröning/Husabø/Jacobsen (2019), pp. 627–633.
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ciently severe reaction for many offences. Important for our current perspective is
that rehabilitative considerations play a central role in the use of this sanction.
First of all, ‘defensive’ rehabilitative considerations are central to the court’s de-
liberation over whether to apply this reaction.65 If imprisonment will intervene in
an ongoing rehabilitation of the offender, this suggests that a less intrusive pun-
ishment shall be applied. For instance, in regard to drug offences, the reaction is
used where there is a ‘clear and strong rehabilitation possibility’ so that imprison-
ment will damage the positive development that the offender is experiencing.66
When applied—for this or for other reasons—the court sets a number of hours
between 30 and 420, and leaves it to the Correctional Service to decide on how
these hours are to be spent.67 Working for society is one option, rehabilitative
programmes are another.
Furthermore, the rules of suspended sentences of imprisonment, first intro-
duced by Hagerup prior to the enactment of the code of 1902, have also been sub-
ject to continuous change.68 These changes primarily concern the available con-
ditions that the court may apply for the offender to fulfil during the period of
suspension (usually two years).69 This list has gradually increased. Today, it in-
cludes a series of alternatives, including the performance of a rehabilitative pro-
gramme for alcoholism aimed at drunk drivers, and a specific court-led rehabili-
tative programme for drug addiction.70 Further alternatives include bans on the
use of alcohol or drugs, institutionalisation for treatment of mental illness, and
specific measures aimed at children, supplementary to the more serious reaction
youth punishment that we will address below.71 The list is ‘open-ended’ so the
court may apply other criteria that are considered suitable in the specific case.72
Together, the community sentence and the list of criteria for suspended sen-
tences become a kind of carte du jour, where the court has great flexibility to find
an appropriate rehabilitative sanction for the specific offender. Proportionality
considerations set limits in this regard, and the use of either suspended sentences
65 On this notion, see M. Holmboe, Fengsel eller frihet? Om teori og praksis i norsk straffutmåling,
særlig i grenselandet mellom fengsel og mildere reaksjoner (Cappelen, Oslo 2018), pp. 60–62.
66 From the Norwegian Supreme Court’s decision in Rt. 2013.630, sect. 14–15.
67 Code of administration of punishment 18 May 2001 sect. 53, second paragraph.
68 The rules were amended already in 1955, but the use of conditional sentence had then already
expanded in practice, see Hauge (1996), pp. 257–258. See now PC 2005 sect. 34–39, in particular
sect. 37.
69 For further reading, see Gröning/Husabø/Jacobsen (2019), pp. 617–619.
70 PC 2005 sect. 37 f.).
71 PC 2005 sect. 37 j).
72 PC 2005 sect. 37 k).
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or community sentences requires that the offence is not very serious.73 This is,
however, only a starting point and exceptions can be made, as stated for commu-
nity sentences in section 48 second paragraph of the 2005 code. For the most ser-
ious offences, proportionality considerations remain the most important and,
where necessary, will limit the use of community sentences and (in particular) sus-
pended sentences. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has displayed awillingness to
push this limit back. One recent example concerned a woman, convicted for ser-
ious drug crimes, including a breach of section 232 second paragraph first period
(which sets the punishment for such acts as imprisonment for between 3 and
15 years), as she had received ten kilos of methamphetamine. The district court
sentenced her to unconditional imprisonment for seven years and six months.
After appeal, the Supreme Court, which is highly influential for sentencing prac-
tices in Norway, opted for a six-year-suspended imprisonment provided that the
defendant carried out the court-led drug programme, so that her ‘extraordinarily
positive development over a period for almost three years’ could be continued.74
When it comes to youths, this system of rehabilitative options is even further
extended into even more serious offences.75 In the code of 2005, the legislator
introduced a new innovation: youth punishment. This is a rehabilitative sanction,
which aims to reduce the use of unconditional prison sentences for young offen-
ders even further than community sentences allow for. The reaction is also dis-
tinct as to its content. It is a restorative-justice inspired reaction, where the con-
victed youth will have to take part in a meeting where a representative for the
conflict council takes part, in addition to others who have a stake either in the
offence (e.g., the victim) or in the offender (such as parents or school representa-
tives). In this meeting, a youth plan is worked out, which contains strict condi-
tions for the youth for a certain period. The youth has to accept the plan, or go to
prison. Despite a large amount of discretion available to those working out the
plan, there is no court supervision, a solution which has been heavily criticised.76
What of the middle category within the positivistic system of sanctions? In the
Norwegian system, this can be said to be represented by traditional forms of pun-
73 See e.g., Rt. 2013.776: A 17-year old boy had raped an elderly woman. This was considered too
serious for a community sentence tobeapplied.However, oneof five judgesdissentedandvoted for
a community sentence.
74 HR-2019–1643-A.
75 For an analysis of the Norwegian rules and also a comparison with the German and Swedish
youth justice systems, see I. Fornes, Straff av barn. Frihetsstraffene og alternativene (UiB, Bergen
2018).
76 See Gröning/Husabø/Jacobsen (2019), pp. 633–639, also with references to some of the critical
opinions.
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ishment, i.e., sanctions that are designed to communicate to the offender the
wrong done. These forms of punishment, first and foremost in terms of imprison-
ment or fines determined by the seriousness of the offence, remain in place and
are used when there are no particular rehabilitative reasons or need for incapaci-
tation. Also at this point there is, however, a certain development to register. The
use of imprisonment has for a long time been decreasing in Norway, a process in
which the introduction of community service (amongst other things) played a
part. However, in recent years the punishment for certain offences, violent and
sexual offences in particular, has been significantly increased.77 Here we also see
an institutional change: The Norwegian sentencing practice has for a long time
been (comparatively) strongly centred on the rulings of the Supreme Court, which
has had the role of a kind of semi-legislator in this regard.78 After a longstanding
‘dialogue’ between the legislator, who called for more severe punishment for cer-
tain offences, and the Supreme Court, which for different (in many regards good)
reasons was reluctant to follow the legislator’s sometimes diffuse signalling, the
legislator applied stronger means. In the preparatory works to the code of 2005,
the legislator went one step further to gain influence on sentencing practice. The
legislator picked examples from previous court practice and stated what the (in-
creased) punishment for such cases should now be. Thereby, the legislator took a
significant step into what has previously been considered the Supreme Court’s
prerogative. For murder, for example, the ‘normal’ level of punishment was raised
from 10 years to 12 years in a single stroke.79 Even more dramatic (from a Norwe-
gian point of view) is the increase in sentences for certain sexual offences. Con-
cerning the punishment for rape of a sleeping victim, the level of punishment was
twelve times higher in 2013 than in 2000.80
What we have seen so far is that we started out from a classical, retrospective
blame and proportionality-centred conception of punishment in the 1842 code.
However, via the somewhat more complex and partly positivism-influenced sys-
tem of sanctions in the code of 1902, the developments related to the code of 2005
have ended up in a multifaceted system of punishments. The two-track system of
punishment and preventive means such as preventive detention has been aban-
doned, by giving preventive detention the status of punishment. Furthermore, re-
77 For an overview, see Jacobsen (2017b), p. 127.
78 Generally on the relationship between legislator, the courts, and the administration, see Grön-
ing/Husabø/Jacobsen (2019), pp. 608–609.
79 Ot.prp. nr. 22 (2008–2009), p. 431.
80 SeeM. Matningsdal, «Høyesterett somstraffedomstol– straffutmåling», inG. Bergby/T. Schei/
J. E. A. Skoghøy/T. M. Øie (eds.), Lov Sannhet Rett – Norges Høyesterett 200 år (Universitetsforla-
get, Oslo 2015), pp. 548–595, p. 576.
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habilitation has gained a stronger influence on other forms of punishment now
available. To some extent, these preventive means are sought limited by propor-
tionality considerations. Still, major departures from the proportionality principle
can be observed. The contours of a multi-track system (of aims) within the system
of punishment are thus beginning to appear.
3. Adding a broader perspective: blurring foundational
distinctions
A central feature of positivism is that it downplays the normative importance of
the theoretical or principled distinctions that classical criminal law theorists
usually emphasise. Distinctions such as those between wrongfulness, responsi-
bility, and sanctions can, from a positivistic point of view, only be (more or less)
useful means to identify those who should be reacted against.81 For Liszt, for in-
stance, the very distinction between punishment and safety measures could be
questioned:
‘Auch vermag er –wie in manch anderer Stellungnahme – nicht zu unterdrücken, daß er die
ganze Scheidung von Strafen und sichernden Maßnahmen unter rein wissenschaftlichem
Aspekt für nicht nachvollziehbar und unsinnig halte.’82
Here, as shown, the forvaring-punishment in Norway is more faithful to the posi-
tivistic approach than Liszt himself was. That positivism downplays the impor-
tance of traditional distinctions within the criminal law system gives us reason to
broaden the perspective beyond punishment in the formal sense, and also look
into the distinction between the criteria of criminal responsibility and the sanc-
tioning part of the 2005 code, and even into the so-called other criminal sanctions
which are not defined as punishment, but still applied as reactions to offences as
part of the criminal proceedings.
The distinction between the criteria of criminal responsibility and the sanc-
tioning part of the criminal code has traditionally been drawn quite sharply. In
line with the clarity requirement (Bestimmtheitsgebot), it is generally an important
task for the legislator to clarify on what grounds one can become criminally re-
sponsible, as this is a prerequisite for the applicability of punishment.83 This is not
81 See here also for instance Naucke (1982), pp. 545–546.
82 W.Frisch,DasMarburger ProgrammunddieMaßregelnderBesserungundSicherung,ZStW94
(1982), pp. 565–598, p. 571 with further references.
83 Further on the clarity requirement, see J. Jacobsen, Fragment til forståing av den rettsstatlege
strafferetten (Fagbokforlaget, Bergen 2009), pp. 320 ff.
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only important to the predictability of the law, but important also for the preven-
tion of abuse of power: if the question of criminal responsibility was a matter of
court discretion, then this would allow, for instance, for the character of the spe-
cific offender to influence whether punishment shall be applied. The clarity re-
quirement cannot be too strictly interpreted: the limitations of language, the need
for a certain flexibility in the norms, and the need for certain general norms such
as the rules of necessity and self-defence to apply across specific offences, are all
good reasons for this. Still, the ambition of clarity is essential, and in recent years
—influenced by the practice of the European Court of Human Rights—the Norwe-
gian Supreme Court has interpreted section 96 of the Norwegian Constitution and
the European Convention of Human Rights Article 7 more strictly than before.84
However, when it comes to the distinction between criteria for criminal responsi-
bility and the sanctions, the Norwegian legislator seems to be moving towards a
less strict approach. Most notably, this has been the case in regard to corporate
criminal responsibility.85
When the general rules for corporate criminal responsibility were enacted
(again as part of the process of developing the 2005 code), a high level of discre-
tion for the courts was applied.86 Fulfilling the formal criteria for such responsi-
bility does not imply that the company will be punished. In fact, there is even no
general presumption that it will be. Instead, the courts are assigned to make an
individual consideration, based upon a set of points enumerated in the code.87
This list contains different points, including traditional criminal law considera-
tions related to the seriousness of the offence and whether the company can be
blamed for it, but also less familiar considerations such as whether the company
has been sanctioned by others for the offence and what the company has done to
avoid further offences. Even the current financial situation of the company can be
taken into account. In the 2005 code, this discretionary component became even
more important as the legislator removed or seriously weakened the requirement
concerning intent or negligence on the part of the person who acted on behalf of
the company.88 Instead, this is of relevance only to the discretion of the court. The
84 See e.g., the SupremeCourt´s decision inHR-2016–1458-A, 18. See alsoGröning/Husabø/Jacob-
sen (2019), pp. 61–76 and especially p. 68–72, with further references, for more on this topic.
85 On the Norwegian law on corporate criminal responsibility, see Gröning/Husabø/Jacobsen
(2019), pp. 743–769, with further references.
86 PC 2005 sect. 27.
87 PC 2005 sect. 28.
88 See the PC 2005 sect. 27, first paragraph that says: ‘When a penal provision is violated by a
personwhohasactedonbehalf of an enterprise, the enterprise is liable to punishment. This applies
even if no single person meets the culpability or the accountability requirement, see section 20’
(Stiftelsen Lovtata’s translation).
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rules on corporate criminal responsibility have been subject to debate.89 In parti-
cular, in light of the current development it is fair to ask whether this sanction at
all belongs in criminal law.
This weakening of the demarcation line between the criteria for criminal re-
sponsibility and the sanctioning system appears also for individuals, albeit not in
such a clear-cut way as for corporations. An example of this is provided by the
new regulations concerning ignorance of the law. Here, the legislator has opted to
consider certain instances of ignorance that in some way concern legal matters,
but which had previously been considered as intent-relevant factual mistakes, as
cases of ignorance of the law, which have a higher threshold for excuse of crim-
inal responsibility.90 This implies a shift from a requirement of intent to negli-
gence. Already during the drafting of this rule, this was subject to critique.91 How-
ever, the critique was downplayed by the possibility of solving unfairly and
harshly treated cases by reducing the punishment or simply abstaining from ap-
plying a punishment.92 Other examples of downplaying the distinction between
criteria for criminal responsibility and sanctioning can be found in several rules
that now give the court more discretion on whether the existence of certain facts
should absolve one from criminal responsibility or not. Disproportionate self-de-
fence is an example of this.93 Previously, these rules shielded one from criminal
responsibility if certain criteria were fulfilled. This has now been changed to being
a part of the sanctioning system.
The other perspective we should add to our investigation is the development
of the so-called ‘other criminal sanctions’.94 This covers a long series of other re-
actions that can be applied to an offence, in many cases even if the criteria for
criminal responsibility are not fulfilled. This is for instance the case with forfeiture
of criminal gains or means for criminal offences.95 Most interestingly for us is the
continuous extension of the safeguarding measures. As mentioned, in 2001 there
was a reform of the safeguarding measures, which resulted in the current forvar-
89 See Gröning/Husabø/Jacobsen (2019), pp. 745–748, with further references. After the Norwe-
gian Parliament requested the Government to propose a clearer andmore effective anti-corruption
legislation inMay 2018, the lawyer and scholar Knut Høivik has been assigned to evaluate the anti-
corruption rules and corporate criminal responsibility in general.
90 PC 2005 sect. 25 on factualmistakes and sect. 26 on legal mistakes.
91 SeeGröning/Husabø/Jacobsen (2019), pp. 250–256, alsowith references toother critiqueof this
solution.
92 Ot.prp. nr. 90 (2003–2004), p. 430.
93 PC 2005 sect. 81, letter b.
94 Listed in the Penal Code 2005 section 30. See further Gröning/Husabø/Jacobsen (2019),
pp. 645–664.
95 PC 2005 sect. 66–76.
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ings-punishment for dangerous offenders.96 This reform also generated preventive
means for insane offenders and persons with mental disability, both of which
principally belong in the care of the mental health sector and/or social services,
not in the criminal justice system.97 For this reason, these forms of preventive de-
tention were limited to highly serious crimes. In a reform in 2016, however, so-
called ‘troublesome’ insane offenders were also included.98 Thereby, the criminal
law was assigned responsibility even for insane offenders who represent a danger
for instance, for drug crimes or burglary.99 Furthermore, in 2019, the insanity reg-
ulation was amended in terms of a step away from the traditional medical model
applied in Norwegian criminal law, to a new, more discretionary regulation.100
So, on the one hand the system of criminal sanctions has been extended to go
further into covering groups or individuals that do not belong within the criminal
justice system in the first place. On the other hand, the system for whether and
how these individuals should be sanctioned is now blurred. This adds to the de-
velopment we have seen in regards to the forms of punishment and use thereof.
IV. Analysis: The Last Laugh Is on Liszt?
Let us now turn from these many different amendments in the Norwegian system
of criminal sanctions in recent decades, and add an overall perspective on the
development. Whereas a proportionality-based system will contain different cate-
gories for different severities of crimes, in the Norwegian criminal justice system
offender traits seem to be increasingly central, and proportionality considerations
correspondingly less so. One perspective on this development is to view it as a
reorientation from the seriousness of acts to a judgement of individual charac-
ters.101 However, a character orientation can be either ethical in an Aristotelian
sense where our characters are what we in the end are responsible for and (hence)
can be blamed for or instrumental where the character of the offender is central to
the judgement of how the state should deal with this specific offender, or groups
96 PC 2005 sect. 40–47.
97 PC 2005 sect. 62–65.
98 PC 2005 sect. 62, first paragraph, second sentence and forth paragraph. See also NOU 2014: 10.
99 See further Gröning/Husabø/Jacobsen (2019), pp. 661–662.
100 PC 2005 sect. 20 is amended by Lov om endringer i straffeloven og straffeprosessloven mv.
(skyldevne, samfunnsvern og sakkyndighet) 21. juni 2019 nr. 48, not yet (October 2019) in force. See
here also e.g., L. Gröning, Hvordan skal vi avgjøre om alvorlig sinnslidelse innebærer utilregne-
lighet? Refleksjoner om lovforslaget i Prop. 154 L (2016–2017), BJCLCJ 5 (2017), pp. 77–85.
101 See further Jacobsen (2017b), pp. 136–141.
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of such. The Norwegian development is clearly most compatible with the latter of
the two alternatives. It is also here that the Liszt-perspective may help us sharpen
our interpretation of the development, as this can be said to concretise this kind of
instrumental approach.102
If we once more pick up on the three-track system of incapacitation of dan-
gerous offenders, deterrence-like reactions for normal offenders, and rehabilita-
tion of offenders with the need and potential for this, the article so far has shown
that the Norwegian system of criminal sanctions shows signs of developing into
this kind of differentiated system, with clearer instrumental ‘tracks’ for different
kinds of offenders. There is, as we have seen, a separate, indeterminate punish-
ment for dangerous offenders, while community sentences, youth punishment,
and suspended sentences (with requirements of completion of rehabilitation pro-
grammes) are central alternatives for those who can be improved. Thereby, it
seems as if the Norwegian system of criminal sanctions today lies closer to being
a positivistic code than the code of 1902 ever was, and thereby something Liszt
would have been even more sympathetic towards than he was to the code of
1902.103 Even if Liszt did not have a strong impact on Norwegian criminal law in
1902, he may have sown a seed which now may be about to blossom.
However, other observations may dispute this. As mentioned, in Norway
there has not been much talk of Liszt’s ideas in recent years, and other develop-
ments in the same period may seem to contradict the aforementioned a view. In
regard to some crimes at least, proportionality considerations seem to have
gained a stronger influence, resulting in harsher punishment for certain crimes,
violence and sexual offences in particular. However, this seems often a result of
populism and bad political dynamics.104 The perhaps best example of this is drug
crimes, which from the 1970s onwards rapidly increased, leading to professional
drug crimes being punished similarly to murder. This kind of development would
102 In Jacobsen (2017b), p. 139, I only indicated the relevance of the Liszt perspective, however,
without exploring this as I do here.
103 The endurance and influence of Liszt’s ideas are also emphasised in German, see e.g., Stäcker
(2011), pp. 411: ‘Die Betrachtungen der verschiedenen Abschnitte der Strafrechtsentwicklung ha-
ben gezeigt, welch weitreichenden Einfluss die Ideen Franz von Liszts über seinen Tod hinaus bis
zur Gegenwart ausüben.’
104 On criminal policy populism in Norway, see e.g., R. Hauge, Populisme, politikk og straff, in
E. Schaanning (ed.), Straff i det norske samfunnet (Humanist forlag, Oslo 2002), pp. 51–63. This
populism is of course no particular Norwegian phenomenon, see for instance T. Elholm/R. Colson,
The Symbolic Purpose of EU Criminal Law, R. Colson/S. Field (eds.), EU Criminal Justice and the
Challenges of Diversity: Legal Cultures in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (CUP, Cambridge
2016), pp. 48–64.
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most certainly be rejected by Liszt.105 Populist penal policy contradicts much of
what Liszt stood for. He was a professional criminal law reformer, committed to a
policy-rational point of view.106 Populism has little to do with the kind of (empiri-
cal) knowledge-based criminal law and the concept and role of (empirical)
science that Liszt advocated. This trend in criminal policy makes the expert role
that Liszt so strongly sought for obsolete.107 From this point of view, the develop-
ment is not in line with Liszt.
However, even though some of the developments certainly have their motive
in populist considerations, other trends in the sanction system clearly have a
more rational policy character, a character that lies much closer to Liszt’s posi-
tion. Examples of this development include the current (indeterminate) forvar-
ings-punishment, loss of rights, for instance in terms of contact-restrictions, and
perhaps most of all, the drive to keep youths out of prison by means of more con-
structive/rehabilitative sanctions. Furthermore, we should distinguish between
the intentions behind the steps that are taken and the results of these. Even if
populism may explain parts of the development, this does not in itself exclude
the possibility of Liszt being able to acknowledge and sympathise with solutions
following from populist motives. It may be that the positivistic development is
‘blind’ in this regard, i.e., that the development of the sanctioning system does
not deliberately follow an overall programme, but rather consists in a series of
separate changes reflecting partly overlapping, partly conflicting aims, that to-
gether result in something like a positivistic programme. Finally, even in regard
to the populist drives, there may be more compatibility with Liszt’s ideas than
what this rational/irrational dichotomy at first may indicate. The emphasis on
proportionality with regard to violence and sexual crimes may at least in part be
considered as drivers towards incapacitation in disguise. The (seemingly) propor-
tionality-driven sentence increase can, at least to some extent, be said to reflect
the dangerousness-track within the sanctioning system, so too are attempts to
increase the level of punishment for multiple offences.108 Another question is,
then, why does a criminal justice system which is subject to such populism end
up in a positivist-like system? This we will get back to.
105 Thanks to professor Thomas Elholm (Copenhagen) for pressingme on this point.
106 See e.g., Liszt (1899), in particular pp. 293–294. See here also Stäcker (2011), pp. 362–364.
107 See further on recent criminal policy and the changing role of the criminal lawexpert in Jacob-
sen (2009), pp. 31–84.
108 A government proposal from 2016 about significantly increased punishment in cases where
several crimes were to be sentenced received much criticism and was rejected, see Gröning/
Husabø/Jacobsen (2019), p. 672.
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So, it still seems fair to describe the development as ‘positivistic’, even if not
in the sense of being an intentional implementation of, for instance, Liszt’s (scien-
tific) programme. The absence of this kind of programme follows clearly from the
fact that in the decades up until the code of 2005, the Norwegian criminal law
hardly had any such principled programmes to be developed from. Certainly, Nor-
wegian criminal law is founded on principles.109 It originates from and still be-
longs to the Continental family of criminal law orders, founded on two fundamen-
tal principles in particular: the formal principle of nulla poena sine lege and the
material principle of guilt. These principles are essential to the entire Norwegian
criminal law and constitutive of the system of rules that currently exists. In addi-
tion, it should be mentioned that recently, the Norwegian constitution of 1814 was
revised and expanded to mirror the ECHR, which resulted in a stronger rights-
basis also for criminal law.110 Moreover, to some extent the drafting of the code of
2005 included some principled ambitions. Most notably, the Penal Code Commis-
sion did opt for a harm principle as the guiding principle for criminalisation,
which the legislator accepted, even if it somewhat downplayed it by adopting a
more watered-down version.111 In addition, the contemporary return to the histor-
ical system of criminal law versus police law, by removing many reactions to
breaches of administrative law from the sphere of criminal law, should be men-
tioned here. In time, this may result in something that can resemble the German
system of Ordnungswidrigkeiten.112 So, it would thereby be wrong to say that Nor-
wegian criminal law lacks principles.
However, these principles reside in, and are weakened by, a pragmatic legal
culture.113 First of all, this allows for many conflicting ‘principles’. For instance,
the turn to the harm principle appears shallow, and illustrates how Norwegian
criminal law can ‘adopt’ different principles alongside others and water them
down into a mishmash of ideas and compromises. Nowhere is this more evident
109 See for a ‘rational reconstruction’, Jacobsen (2009), pp. 401 ff.
110 For an overview of the expanded catalogue of rights in the Constitution, see e.g., J. Aall,
Rettsstat ogmenneskerettigheter. En innføring i vernet om individets sivile og politiske rettigheter etter
den norske forfatning og etter den europeiske menneskerettighetskonvensjon, 5. utg. (Fagbokforla-
get, Bergen 2018).
111 For a critical analysis, see T. Frøberg, Prinsippstyring av strafferettspolitikken, Kritisk juss 36
(2010), pp. 38–63 and, for instance, in regard to criminalisation of use and possession for use in
J. Jacobsen/S. Taslaman, The Norwegian Criminal Regulation of Drugs: An Overview and Some
Principled Challenges, Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 6 (2018), pp. 20–52.
112 Discussed in detail in J. Jacobsen, Gjensynmed kriminalretten?, G. Heivoll/S. Flaatten (eds.),
Rettslige overgangsformer: Politi- og kriminalrett i nordisk rettsutvikling (Akademisk publ., Oslo
2017c), pp. 284–325.
113 See Jacobsen (2011).
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than in the sentencing ideology of the Supreme Court, which is highly flexible and
gives room for different and conflicting considerations, in clear contrast to, for
instance, the proportionality-focused system in Sweden.114 Another feature of this
pragmatic legal culture is the influence of utility-considerations. For instance, the
sanctioning system reform, where steps were taken to move the administrative
offences out of criminal law into an administrative sanctioning system, was not
first and foremost a principled project, but instead a response to efficiency pro-
blems. What we are speaking of here is a kind of ‘surface fluidity’ where the deep
structural basis in Continental-style criminal law has not been a hindrance for
surface solutions that are in clear tension with this basis. Thereby, the criminal
law has been left open to a series of unprincipled changes, which seem to have in
common that they strengthen criminal law as an instrument of control—which in-
deed the Norwegian welfare state has a tendency towards.115
Behind these developments lie tendencies and drivers well known to criminal
law discourse, which we already have touched upon.116 This covers tendencies
such as the repressive drive and politicisation of criminal law from the 1980s on-
wards, economic crises, and neo-liberal economic thinking in the justice sector. It
also includes ‘sectoral’ human rights advocates that have forged an allegiance
with control-oriented political forces, for the protection of women and children in
particular—both of which lack understanding of the different freedom spheres
that must be taken into account for a valid and justifiable development of crim-
inal law. Yet it is not only ‘negative’ forces that have been in play. The aforemen-
tioned development concerning youths, for instance, is also a product of a stron-
ger emphasis on the rights of children. However, when we sum up the results of
this unfolding of different forces and their influence on the development on the
Norwegian criminal justice system, we see the emergence of different lines of de-
velopment that in effect resemble positivistic-style thinking.
So, to close this article, it is fair to ask: what is the value of this Liszt analogy?
First of all, we may have got closer to an explanation of why Norway was to be-
come hailed as a beacon for positivism at the beginning of the 20th century. The
explanation may very well be a certain receptiveness in the Norwegian legal cul-
114 See e.g., M. Borgeke/M. Heidenborg, Att bestämma påföljd för brott, 3rd ed. (Wolters Kluwer,
Stockholm 2016), in particular pp. 31 ff.
115 See further e.g., the debates on the so-called ‘Nordic exceptionalism’ in penal policy in
T. Ugelvik/J. Dullum, Penal Exceptionalism? Nordic Prison Policy and Practice (Routledge, London
2012).
116 Several important theoretical enterprises have put this development under scrutiny, see, for
instance, the works of Markus D. Dubber, such as The Dual Penal State – The Crisis of Criminal Law
in Comparative-Historical Perspective (Oxford, OUP 2018).
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ture for ideas of the kind advocated by Liszt. In addition, I think we have become
able to give more contours to what otherwise is a clearly confusing development
in the Norwegian system of criminal sanctions. Such overarching perspectives
have been lacking in recent decades, and the Norwegian system of criminal sanc-
tions, in all its fluidity and complexity, is in my opinion best captured by this
analogy. It also has a further benefit: it brings us back to a time where there were
principled and theoretical perspectives on this development. Hagerup’s growing
scepticism towards the positivistic enterprise may remind us of the reasons we
have for keeping a critical eye on contemporary developments. Historically, posi-
tivism challenged central criminal law principles, principles that not least were
developed from the experience of abuse of power in pre-modern European socie-
ties. It might be that the Marburger Programme was the breakthrough of modern
criminal law, and there is no alternative today to this kind of criminal law.117 This
does not, however, exclude the possibility of influencing the development and
the concrete outcome of this process. We should use this Lisztian analogy as a
basis for developing some kind of normatively more robust architecture for the
Norwegian system of criminal sanctions. Finally, this Norwegian story can also
be said to give some feedback to the discussion of Liszt’s programme. In my opi-
nion, it testifies to the problems with this view of criminal law that a ‘blind’ and so
troubled development as the one in the Norwegian system of criminal sanctions
so easily falls into the picture of being a positivistic system of criminal sanctions.
117 See in particular Naucke (1982), p. 563: ‘Vielleicht besteht v. Liszts Größe darin, gesehen und
ausgesprochen zu haben, daß im modernen Staat wirklich keine Alternative zum zweckmäßigen
Strafrecht besteht, daß dieses Strafrecht politisch nicht zu vermeiden ist.’
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